



F-Response® Validation Testing Report
Includes F-Response Field Kit, Consultant, and Enterprise
(Windows, Linux, and Apple OS X)
March 2009

Document Control

This is a controlled document produced by Agile Risk Management LLC ("AGILE"). The control and release of this document is the responsibility of the AGILE document owner. This includes any amendment that may be required.

Issue Control			
Issue	2.0	Date	March 24, 2009
Classification	Public	Author	M. Shannon
Document Title	F-Response Validation Testing Report		
Approved by	M. Shannon		
Released by	M. Shannon		

Owner Details	
Name	Matthew M Shannon
Office/Region	Agile Risk Management LLC Corporate Offices
Contact Number	1-800-317-5497
E-mail Address	mshannon@f-response.com

Revision History			
Issue	Date	Author	Comments
Draft 0.1	09/03/2008	Matthew Shannon	Initial Draft
Final 1.0	09/07/2008	Matthew Decker	Reviewed by
Final 1.0	09/08/2008	Matthew Shannon	Initial Final Document Release
Draft 1.1	01/15/2009	Matthew Shannon	Modified to include Linux and Apple OS X Testing Results
Final 2.0	03/24/2009	Matthew Decker	Reviewed by
Final 2.0	03/31/2009	Matthew Shannon	Second Final Document Release

Table of Contents

TESTING RESULTS SUMMARY	4
1 INTRODUCTION	5
1.1 Scope	5
1.2 Purpose	6
1.3 Document Layout	6
2 TEST RESULTS	7
2.1 Disk Validity	7
2.2 Read Accuracy	9
2.3 Write Prevention	11
3 TEST ENVIRONMENT	13
3.1 Test Environment Software	13
4 TEST RESULT DETAILS	14
4.1 Obtain Baseline (Windows)	14
4.2 Obtain Baseline (Linux)	17
4.3 Obtain Baseline (Apple OS X)	20
4.4 Disk Validity Testing – Encase	22
4.5 Read Accuracy Testing – Encase, X-Ways	27
4.6 Write Prevention Testing – Windows.....	33
4.7 Write Prevention Testing – Linux, Apple OS X.....	41
APPENDIX A. CONTACTS.....	44



APPENDIX B. LEGAL NOTICES.....	45
--------------------------------	----

Testing Results Summary

The purpose of this testing is to validate the accuracy and reliability of F-Response software using the repeatable test method presented herein. The results of the testing are hereby published for independent validation and peer review.

F-Response uses a patent-pending process based on the well documented "iSCSI" industry standard to create a reliable, read-only connection between an examiner's computer and a computer under inspection. The function of the F-Response software tested herein is that an established F-Response iSCSI network connection is completely read-only, functioning much like a software write blocker albeit over a network connection. The testing validates that F-Response software protects the integrity of the data on the computer under inspection because it does not permit alteration of any data on the computer under inspection during the test.

The results of our testing confirm that the iSCSI network connection established by F-Response software does reliably and accurately create a read-only connection between an examiner's computer and a computer under inspection. Our testing uses generally accepted forensics techniques and tools to verify and validate the results. The scientific method presented is done so in accordance with the Daubert Principles (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579, 589), and as such we submit that F-Response is suitable for use in acquiring data that is intended for use in a court of law.

Unless otherwise noted, all testing activities were performed against the F-Response application code base (F-Response Field Kit, Consultant, and Enterprise Edition), release 3.09 (Windows, Linux, and Apple OS X).

1 Introduction

1.1 Scope

The scope of this project was limited to the validation and testing of F-Response Field Kit, Consultant, and Enterprise Edition on the following platforms.

- Microsoft Windows
 - Windows 2000 Professional
 - Windows 2000 Server
 - Windows XP Professional
 - Windows XP Professional 64
 - Windows 2003 Server
 - Windows Vista Business
 - Windows Vista Business 64
 - Windows 2008 Server
 - Windows 2008 Server 64
 - Windows 7 (Build 7000)
 - Windows 7 (Build 7000) 64
- Linux
 - Fedora Core (4 – 10)
 - Ubuntu (6.04 – 8.10)
- Apple
 - OS X 10.4 PPC
 - OS X 10.5 Intel

1.2 Purpose

This document outlines the F-Response Software validation process, results, and methodology developed and executed by Agile Risk Management LLC. F-Response Software validation answers the following questions:

- Disk Validity
 - Does F-Response accurately present the remote Physical Disk(s)?
- Read Accuracy
 - Does F-Response correctly and accurately read data from the remote Physical Disk(s)?
- Write Prevention
 - Does F-Response effectively prevent write operations from occurring on the remote Physical Disk(s)?

1.3 Document Layout

This document will adhere to the following layout:

- Test Results
 - Presents a table representing the test results by operating system.
- Test Environment and Procedure
 - Presents the environment and procedure used in the testing process.
- Test Results Details
 - Presents the detailed results of the testing procedures, including screen captures.

2 Test Results

2.1 Disk Validity

Does F-Response effectively present the remote PhysicalDisk(s)?

In order to test the validity of the locally attached remote F-Response iSCSI disk, we collected the total disk size in sectors and the sector size using multiple local data collection sources. This provided a baseline to test against when the F-Response disk is attached to our local workstation for analysis. While not explicitly noted, the results of these tests were identical for each version of F-Response tested, Field Kit, Consultant, and Enterprise. The detailed process used to obtain these results is included in section 4 of this document.

Disk Validity Testing Results	Native (Local Machine)		Remote (F-Response Presented)		Result
	Total Sectors	Sector Size	Total Sectors	Sector Size	
Windows 2000 Professional	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Windows 2000 Server	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Windows XP Professional	12582912	512	12582912	512	PASS
Windows XP Professional 64	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Windows 2003 Standard Edition Server	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Windows Vista Business	33554432	512	33554432	512	PASS
Windows Vista Business 64	33554432	512	33554432	512	PASS
Windows 2008 Enterprise Server	33554432	512	33554432	512	PASS
Windows 2008 Enterprise Server 64	33554432	512	33554432	512	PASS
Windows 7 (Build 7000)	33554432	512	33554432	512	PASS
Windows 7 (Build 7000) 64	50331648	512	50331648	512	PASS
Fedora Core 4	8388608	512	8388608	512	PASS
Fedora Core 5	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Fedora Core 6	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Fedora Core 7	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Fedora Core 8	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Fedora Core 9	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Fedora Core 10	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Ubuntu Server 6.06	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS

Ubuntu Server 6.10	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Ubuntu Server 7.04	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Ubuntu Server 7.10	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Ubuntu Server 8.04	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Ubuntu Server 8.10	16777216	512	16777216	512	PASS
Apple OS X 10.4 PPC	117210240	512	117210240	512	PASS
Apple OS X 10.5 Intel	312581808	512	312581808	512	PASS

2.2 Read Accuracy

Does F-Response correctly and accurately read data from the remote PhysicalDisk(s)?

In order to test the read accuracy of the locally attached remote F-Response iSCSI disk, we obtained hash values for the individual files listed below, as well as a portion of the raw disk (Physical Sector 6291519) from the local F-Response disk. Both these hash values were then computed using select Computer Forensics software packages on their native operating system. While not explicitly noted, the results of these tests were identical for each version of F-Response tested, Field Kit, Consultant, and Enterprise.

Read Accuracy Testing Results	Native (Local Machine)		Remote (F-Response Presented)		Result
	File Hash	Data Hash	File Hash	Data Hash	
Windows 2000 Professional	2ECC0CD4197C012F9D0FCFF7F78E1D34	BE7CF63AAC0AA8E140BA84F4CB0D6F01	2ecc0cd4197c012f9d0fcff7f78e1d34	BE7CF63AAC0AA8E140BA84F4CB0D6F01	PASS
Windows 2000 Server	2ECC0CD4197C012F9D0FCFF7F78E1D34	BE7CF63AAC0AA8E140BA84F4CB0D6F01	2ecc0cd4197c012f9d0fcff7f78e1d34	BE7CF63AAC0AA8E140BA84F4CB0D6F01	PASS
Windows XP Professional	C1B29B4E6EEA9510610DB2EC4D6DB160	2204D7C2DF92DA3D8AFA7493014D707	c1b29b4e6ee9510610db2ec4d6db160	2204D7C2DF92DA3D8AFA7493014D707	PASS
Windows XP Professional 64	eaad72a0cbd33f63d4cda5e933a5d6d8	184DF2E5F625495AB65C82C6E7CDD76	eaad72a0cbd33f63d4cda5e933a5d6d8	184DF2E5F625495AB65C82C6E7CDD76	PASS
Windows 2003 Standard Edition Server	971757832F7DD9516977985999F527CA	839B7586271A6E65262E86B12072C60C	971757832f7dd9516977985999f527ca	839B7586271A6E65262E86B12072C60C	PASS
Windows Vista Business	9E24B834DC6FC0634C28004721DF9D82	0BFD435DED2FFBD890062D36ABB6A830	9e24b834dc6fc0634c28004721df9d82	0BFD435DED2FFBD890062D36ABB6A830	PASS
Windows Vista Business 64	57dab7451bc4a63b71a1f6d258ef7c8b	6267A69C7D36AA761082E2D1175464E0	57dab7451bc4a63b71a1f6d258ef7c8b	6267A69C7D36AA761082E2D1175464E0	PASS
Windows 2008 Enterprise Server	9E24B834DC6FC0634C28004721DF9D82	0BFD435DED2FFBD890062D36ABB6A830	9e24b834dc6fc0634c28004721df9d82	0BFD435DED2FFBD890062D36ABB6A830	PASS
Windows 2008 Enterprise Server 64	9E24B834DC6FC0634C28004721DF9D82	82D205869C776D8C367B477E8438D1F1	9e24b834dc6fc0634c28004721df9d82	82D205869C776D8C367B477E8438D1F1	PASS
Windows 7 (Build 7000)	2B5291C6825C21D4190262E020AB1163	9401419A2FC1FAF919221BEEDE7770A	2b5291c6825c21d4190262e020ab1163	9401419A2FC1FAF919221BEEDE7770A	PASS
Windows 7 (Build 7000) 64	2B5291C6825C21D4190262E020AB1163	D7177B47DCF8F1E3E5BC59F153EE90FA	2b5291c6825c21d4190262e020ab1163	D7177B47DCF8F1E3E5BC59F153EE90FA	PASS
Fedora Core 4	a71e7abce43fb3a62066007d7ad2coe6	935d7c4e010f79fb4d3947d191cb5d7e	a71e7abce43fb3a62066007d7ad2coe6	935d7c4e010f79fb4d3947d191cb5d7e	PASS
Fedora Core 5	cd23994c39661cad3a4a2c838ccbae5	53e6f1dd8b08b4ce450efbc3fec822004	cd23994c39661cad3a4a2c838ccbae5	53e6f1dd8b08b4ce450efbc3fec822004	PASS
Fedora Core 6	69a9a365aefdc12877f386f06698ab03	85de51ffd49743fd35aec5247b1036	69a9a365aefdc12877f386f06698ab03	85de51ffd49743fd35aec5247b1036	PASS
Fedora Core 7	6f3169684750da15642e477efb0e30ff	c89330d2fbd6eaf20386e02534411192	6f3169684750da15642e477efb0e30ff	C89330D2FBD6EAF20386E02534411192	PASS
Fedora Core 8	1fd60eb534fd865502b85247c8a2e004	01c0bbffa80c5ec9f059f2148653af	1fd60eb534fd865502b85247c8a2e004	01c0BBFFA80C5EC9F059F2148653AF	PASS
Fedora Core 9	5de0c0c019929ba25f5a1110f480fec	5f753ae907d950b782aa1e4dce3b9e7	5de0c0c019929ba25f5a1110f480fec	5F753AE907D950B782AA1E4DCE3B9E7	PASS
Fedora Core 10	db9db7e9897eaa492a78c9e362124349	e83bc3df75b7b1bb0261a6154f919f1d	db9db7e9897eaa492a78c9e362124349	E83BC3DF75B7B1BB0261A6154F919F1D	PASS

Ubuntu Server 6.06	e451038f108519e121576c646c46f28c	a073b1a0cbb96938a1699823ba5e69af	e451038f108519e121576c646c46f28c	A073B1A0CBB96938A1699823BA5E69AF	PASS
Ubuntu Server 6.10	fe52708fb10b81b018e609da78ca934	98b4de262ec42072ed15d28be723d2c2	fe52708fb10b81b018e609da78ca934	98B4DE262EC42072ED15D28BE723D2C2	PASS
Ubuntu Server 7.04	fdbf5ae46257db439d38ca5dc911e4e7	07220c3f5a1bc9f89891fd0228288876	fdbf5ae46257db439d38ca5dc911e4e7	07220C3F5A1BCAF89891FD0228288876	PASS
Ubuntu Server 7.10	6e456bdb48be15d1dcb785f2a8376472	8cbbbc673901073134b9607aff7b9f84	6e456bdb48be15d1dcb785f2a8376472	8CBBBC673901073134B9607AFF7B9F84	PASS
Ubuntu Server 8.04	03c03d4413202be5fa08c4c90bf37ede	edfea877fc950eb110ef5666b31066co	03c03d4413202be5fa08c4c90bf37ede	EDFEA877FC950EB110EF5666B31066Co	PASS
Ubuntu Server 8.10	aa609974b6773de6c90a2dbf08ad220c	deb34a7d1c1763f5831babe1056a2276	AA609974B6773DE6C90A2DBF08AD220C	DEB34A7D1C1763F5831BABA1056A2276	PASS
Apple OS X 10.4 PPC	58a9a08922bf15873c1c7fb75b829d7b	fdddf4657481e5d1f5a733e76fe2496bf	58A9A08922BF15873C1C7FB75B829D7B	FDDDF4657481E5D1F5A733E76FE2496BF	PASS
Apple OS X 10.5 Intel	45b608d8d62fa464d3d5055b5e9a09a0	2d281550d07074ec8625bb7942d17e7c	45B608D8D62FA464D3D5055B5E9A09A0	2D281550D07074EC8625BB7942D17E7C	PASS

2.3 Write Prevention

Does F-Response accurately prevent write operations from occurring on the remote PhysicalDisk(s)?¹

In order to test the write prevention capabilities of F-Response, we attempted to perform write operations using both the file system create file and delete file commands, as well as through direct writing to arbitrary locations on the F-Response connected disk. In all cases F-Response silently prevented the write operations. In each case, the local system would return a "success" message, however no actual changes occurred on the remote F-Response disk. While not explicitly noted, the results of these tests were identical for each version of F-Response tested, Field Kit, Consultant, and Enterprise. The detailed process used to obtain these results is included in section 4 of this document.

Write Prevention Testing	Action				Result
Platform	File Deletion		Data Modification		
	System Response	Actual Result	System Response	Actual Result	
Windows 2000 Professional	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Windows 2000 Server	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Windows XP Professional	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Windows XP Professional 64	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Windows 2003 Standard Edition Server	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Windows Vista Business	BLOCKED	BLOCKED	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Windows Vista Business 64	BLOCKED	BLOCKED	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Windows 2008 Enterprise Server	BLOCKED	BLOCKED	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Windows 2008 Enterprise Server 64	BLOCKED	BLOCKED	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Windows 7 (Build 7000)	BLOCKED	BLOCKED	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Windows 7 (Build 7000) 64	BLOCKED	BLOCKED	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Fedora Core 4	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Fedora Core 5	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS

¹ All write operations are prevented, however select write operations are held in memory where necessary to improve operations. No write operations reach the physical disk. Full details of the write tests performed are available in section 4 of this document.



Fedora Core 6	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Fedora Core 7	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Fedora Core 8	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Fedora Core 9	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Fedora Core 10	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Ubuntu Server 6.06	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Ubuntu Server 6.10	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Ubuntu Server 7.04	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Ubuntu Server 7.10	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Ubuntu Server 8.04	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Ubuntu Server 8.10	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Apple OS X 10.4 PPC	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS
Apple OS X 10.5 Intel	NA	NA	SUCCESS	BLOCKED	PASS

3 Test Environment

3.1 Test Environment Software

The following represents a complete listing of the software used to validate F-Response.


Application	Version	Company	Used for	Platform
Forensic Acquisition Utilities (FAU)	1.3.0.2363	GMG	Used in testing Write Prevention in Windows	Windows XP Professional SP3
F-Response (FK, CE, EE)	3.09	Agile Risk Management LLC	Providing remote forensically sound disk access.	Multiple (See Scope Section)
GNU Tools (md5, dd, dmesg)	2.3.5+ (glibc)	Linux	Baseline data collection on the Linux target platform.	Linux (See Scope Section)
Encase Forensic	6.13	Guidance Software Inc.	Verifying capacity, read accuracy.	Windows XP Professional SP3
MacForensicsLab	2.5.4	SubRosaSoft Inc.	Verifying capacity, read accuracy.	Apple OS X 10.5, 10.4
Microsoft iSCSI Initiator	2.08	Microsoft	Required to attach F-Response Disk to Windows	Windows XP Professional SP3
VM Ware ESX Server 3i	3.5.0.123629	VMWare Inc.	Hosting F-Response Test Virtual Machines	VMWare ESXi Hypervisor
X-Ways Forensics/Winhex²	15.0 SR-2	X-Ways Technology AG	Verifying capacity, read accuracy.	Windows XP Professional SP3

² X-Ways permission granted for use of demonstration licensed version.

4 Test Result Details³


4.1 Obtain Baseline (Windows)

Step 1, Open X-Ways WinHex and select the first physical disk, record the provided total number of bytes and sector size. Divide the total number of bytes by the sector size to obtain the sector count. Record the provided values.




³ All testing details assume the F-Response disk has been properly connected using one of the many supported iSCSI Initiator software products, as this process is detailed in numerous training manuals and quick start guides available on the F-Response website (www.f-response.com) it will not be duplicated herein. In addition while only one baseline collection effort is contained herein, this process was repeated for all platforms identified under the Scope section of this document.

Step 2, Obtain file hash value and data hash value, select a system file, double click on it, and select Tools->Compute Hash, select md5 hash and record this value.



The screenshot shows the WinHex application interface. The main window displays the bootmgr file in hexadecimal and ASCII view. A dialog box titled "MD5 (128 bit)" is open, showing the MD5 hash value: 3E24B834DC6FC0634C28004721DF9D82. The dialog box also includes a "Close" button. The WinHex interface includes a menu bar (File, Edit, Search, Position, View, Tools, Specialist, Options, Window, Help), a toolbar, and a status bar at the bottom showing "Page 1 of 549", "Offset: 0", and "Block: 233".

Step 4, Select a single sector on the disk, select Tools->Compute Hash (MD5 128 bit), record the resulting hash value.



The screenshot shows the WinHex application interface. The top menu bar includes File, View, VM, and a toolbar with icons for file operations. The main window is titled 'WinHex - [Hard disk 0, Partition 1]' and shows a file list on the left and a hex view on the right. A dialog box titled 'MD5 (128 bit)' is open, displaying the hash value '82D20585C776D8C367B477E8438D1F1' for the selected sector. The hex view shows the raw data of the selected sector, with the first few bytes being '4D 5A 90 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00'.

Name	Ext	Size	Created	Modified	Accessed	Attr	1st sector
winsock		6.5 MB	01/19/2008 03:11:32	03/24/2009 12:09:08	03/24/2009 12:09:08		1094400
bfsvc.exe	exe	64.0 KB	01/18/2008 22:53:42	01/19/2008 01:00:04	01/18/2008 22:53:42	A	1477384
bootstat.dat	dat	66.0 KB	01/19/2008 07:04:57	03/24/2009 07:55:42	01/19/2008 07:04:57	SA	1477512
Dtinstall.log	log	1.7 KB	01/19/2008 06:54:48	03/01/2009 07:24:10	01/19/2008 06:54:48	A	1477648
explorer.exe	exe	2.9 MB	01/18/2008 23:22:11	01/19/2008 01:00:15	01/18/2008 23:22:11	A	1483680
fveupdate.exe	exe	14.5 KB	01/18/2008 22:52:29	01/19/2008 01:00:17	01/18/2008 22:52:29	A	1489736
HelpPane.exe	exe	0.7 MB	01/18/2008 23:57:48	01/19/2008 01:00:17	01/18/2008 23:57:48	A	1491208
hh.exe	exe	15.5 KB	01/18/2008 23:57:19	11/02/2006 04:15:53	01/19/2008 02:24:18	A	1492712
mib.bin	bin	42.1 KB	01/18/2008 23:37:50	11/02/2006 01:26:50	01/19/2008 02:24:23	A	1492832

Offset: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F

02D473FD0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D473FE0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D473FF0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D474000 4D 5A 90 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D474010 B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D474020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D474030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D474040 0E 1F BA 0E 00 B4

02D474050 69 73 20 70 72 6F 57 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6B 6F

02D474060 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20

02D474070 6D 6F 64 65 2E 0D 0D 0A 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D474080 1E C5 92 92 5A A4 FC C1 5A A4 FC C1 5A A4 FC C1

02D474090 7D 62 92 C1 63 A4 FC C1 7D 62 81 C1 58 A4 FC C1

02D4740A0 7D 62 87 C1 73 A4 FC C1 5A A4 FD C1 80 A7 FC C1

02D4740B0 7D 62 91 C1 45 A4 FC C1 7D 62 8E C1 66 A4 FC C1

02D4740C0 7D 62 80 C1 5B A4 FC C1 7D 62 84 C1 5B A4 FC C1

02D4740D0 52 69 63 68 5A A4 FC C1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D4740E0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D4740F0 50 45 00 00 64 86 06 00 0C 97 91 47 00 00 00 00

02D474100 00 00 00 00 F0 00 22 00 0B 02 08 00 00 32 07 00

02D474110 00 CC 27 00 00 00 00 00 F0 34 02 00 00 10 00 00

02D474120 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 02 00 00

02D474130 06 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D474140 00 40 2F 00 06 00 00 B5 C6 2F 00 02 00 40 81


02D474150 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 E0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02D474160 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Sector: 1483680 of 33550336 Offset: 2D474000 = 77 Block: 2D474000 - 2D4741FF Size: 200


4.2 Obtain Baseline (Linux)

Step 1, Use “dmesg | grep sectors” to return the total number of sectors on the attached disk(s) and sector size.




```
fedora-fc4-i386 on fresponse-esxi.home
File View VM
[red square] [yellow square] [green square] [red/green square] [CD icon] Connect CD/DVD 1 [blue square] [blue square] [blue square]
[root@new-host-2 ~]# dmesg | grep sectors
SCSI device sda: 8388608 512-byte hdwr sectors (4295 MB)
SCSI device sda: 8388608 512-byte hdwr sectors (4295 MB)
[root@new-host-2 ~]# _
```

Step 2, Use "md5sum </path/to/file>" to return generate the hash of a relevant system file.



```
fedora-fc4-i386 on fresponse-esxi.home
File View VM
[red square] [yellow bars] [green play button] [red/green circular arrow] Connect CD/DVD 1 [blue square with white 'x'] [blue square with white 'x'] [blue square with white 'x']
[root@new-host-2 ~]# md5sum /boot/vmlinuz-2.6.11-1.1369_FC4
a71e7abce43fb3a62066007d7ad2c0e6 /boot/vmlinuz-2.6.11-1.1369_FC4
[root@new-host-2 ~]# _
```


Step 3, Use "dd if=/dev/<disk> bs=1b count=1 | md5sum" to return generate the hash of a single sector on the disk.




```
fedora-fc4-i386 on fresponse-esxi.home
File View VM
[red square] [yellow square] [green square] [red square] [blue square] Connect CD/DVD 1 [blue square] [blue square] [blue square]
[root@new-host-2 ~]# dd if=/dev/sda bs=1b count=1 | md5sum
1+0 records in
1+0 records out
935d7c4e010f79fb4d3947d191cb5d7e -
[root@new-host-2 ~]# _
```

4.3 Obtain Baseline (Apple OS X)

Step 1, Use the SubRosaSoft MacForensicsLab to obtain total disk size in bytes and sector size in bytes.




Step 2, Open a Terminal window in Apple OS X and use the following commands to obtain file and data hashes “md5 <path/to/file>” and “dd if=/dev/rdisk0 bs=1b count=1 | md5”.




```
Terminal — bash — 80x24
Last login: Tue Mar 24 12:05:35 on ttys000
new-host:~ mshannon$ md5 /mach_kernel >> osx-i386.txt
new-host:~ mshannon$ sudo dd if=/dev/rdisk0 bs=1b count=1 | md5 >> osx-i386.txt
Password:
1+0 records in
1+0 records out
512 bytes transferred in 0.026721 secs (19161 bytes/sec)
new-host:~ mshannon$
```

4.4 Disk Validity Testing – Encase



Step 1, Open Encase Forensic Edition.



The image shows a 'Case Options' dialog box with a blue title bar and a close button (X) in the top right corner. The dialog contains five text input fields, each with a label to its left: 'Name' (containing 'Test Case'), 'Examiner Name' (containing 'MMS'), 'Default Export Folder' (containing 'H:\Program Files\EnCase6\Export'), 'Temporary Folder' (containing 'H:\Program Files\EnCase6\Temp'), and 'Index Folder' (containing 'H:\Program Files\EnCase6\Index'). Each of the last three fields has a small folder icon button to its right. At the bottom of the dialog are three buttons: '< Back', 'Finish', and 'Cancel'.

Case Options

Name
Test Case

Examiner Name
MMS


Default Export Folder
H:\Program Files\EnCase6\Export

Temporary Folder
H:\Program Files\EnCase6\Temp


Index Folder
H:\Program Files\EnCase6\Index

< Back Finish Cancel


Step 2, Create a new Encase Case File.



Step 3, File->Add Device, select Local Drives




Step 4, Select FRES (F-Response Disk), Note Total Sectors.



Step 5, Press Next and Finish

4.5 Read Accuracy Testing – Encase, X-Ways




The screenshot displays the EnCase Forensic interface. The left pane shows the 'Cases' tree with 'Home' selected. The main pane shows a list of files and folders. The bottom pane shows a hex view of a selected file.


Name	Filter	In Report	File Ext	File Type	File Category	Signature	Description	Is Deleted	Last Accessed
1	\$Extend						Folder, Internal, Hidden,...	06/24/08 04:01:40AM	06/24/08
2	Documents and Set...						Folder	09/04/08 09:07:35AM	06/24/08
3	Program Files						Folder, Read Only	09/04/08 09:07:35AM	06/24/08
4	RECYCLER						Folder, Recycle Bin, Hidd...	09/04/08 09:07:35AM	07/09/08
5	Shared						Folder	08/20/08 01:39:28PM	07/21/08
6	System Volume Info...						Folder, Hidden, System	09/04/08 09:07:35AM	06/24/08
7	WINDOWS						Folder	09/04/08 09:07:35AM	06/24/08
8	wmpub						Folder	08/20/08 01:39:28PM	06/24/08
9	\$MFT						File, Internal, Hidden, Sy...	06/24/08 04:01:40AM	06/24/08
10	\$MFTMirr						File, Internal, Hidden, Sy...	06/24/08 04:01:40AM	06/24/08
11	\$LogFile						File, Internal, Hidden, Sy...	06/24/08 04:01:40AM	06/24/08
12	\$Volume						File, Internal, Hidden, Sy...	06/24/08 04:01:40AM	06/24/08
13	\$AttrDef						File, Internal, Hidden, Sy...	06/24/08 04:01:40AM	06/24/08
14	\$Bitmap						File, Internal, Hidden, Sy...	06/24/08 04:01:40AM	06/24/08
15	\$Boot						File, Internal, Hidden, Sy...	06/24/08 04:01:40AM	06/24/08
16	\$BadClus						File, Internal, Hidden, Sy...	06/24/08 04:01:40AM	06/24/08
17	\$BadClus-\$Bad						File, Internal, Stream, S...		
18	\$Secure						File, Internal, Hidden, Sy...	06/24/08 04:01:40AM	06/24/08
19	\$Secure-\$SI						File, Internal, Stream, S...		
20	\$Secure-\$SDH						File, Internal, Stream, S...		
21	\$Secure-\$SDS						File, Internal, Stream, S...		
22	\$UpCase						File, Internal, Hidden, Sy...	06/24/08 04:01:40AM	06/24/08
23	ntldr						File, Hidden, System, Re...	07/08/08 01:59:59PM	03/25/08
24	NTDETECT.COM			COM	DOS Executable	Code\Executable	File, Hidden, System, Re...	06/24/08 04:04:02AM	03/25/08
25	pagefile.sys			sys	Device Driver	Code\Executable	File, Hidden, System, Ar...	09/04/08 09:07:45AM	06/24/08
26	boot.ini			ini	Initialization	Windows	File, Hidden, System, Ar...	09/04/08 09:09:12AM	06/24/08
27	CONFIG.SYS			SYS	Device Driver	Code\Executable	File, Archive	06/24/08 08:45:39AM	06/24/08
28	AUTOEXEC.BAT			BAT	Batch	Code\Executable	File, Archive	06/24/08 08:45:39AM	06/24/08
29	IO.SYS			SYS	Device Driver	Code\Executable	File, Hidden, System, Re...	06/24/08 08:45:39AM	06/24/08

The bottom pane shows a hex view of the selected file 'ntldr'. The hex data is displayed in a grid, with the first few lines showing the boot sector code.


Step 1, Check File Hashing selected file from F-Response presented disk.



Step 2, Select Menu item Tools->Search, check Compute hash value and Selected items only



Step 3, Press OK when Searching is complete.




The screenshot displays the EnCase Forensic interface. The main window shows a table of search results with columns for Physical Location, Physical Sector, Evidence File, File Identifier, Code Page, Hash Value, Hash Set, Hash Category, and Hash Properties. The table lists 24 entries, with entry 23 selected. The bottom pane shows the detailed properties for the selected file, including Name, Description, Last Accessed, File Created, Last Written, Entry Modified, File Acquired, Logical Size, Initialized Size, Physical Size, Starting Extent, File Extents, Permissions, References, Physical Location, Physical Sector, Evidence File, File Identifier, Code Page, and Hash Value.

	Physical Location	Physical Sector	Evidence File	File Identifier	Code Page	Hash Value	Hash Set	Hash Category	Hash Properties
1	3,221,269,280	6,291,541	3	11	0				
2	228,769,280	446,815	3	3592	0				
3	758,881,792	1,482,191	3	3997	0				
4	3,243,769,640	6,335,487	3	21984	0				
5	3,227,000,648	6,302,735	3	5608	0				
6	3,224,933,304	6,298,697	3	3589	0				
7	42,249,728	82,519	3	28	0				
8	3,228,850,976	6,306,349	3	7415	0				
9	3,221,257,728	6,291,519	3	0	0				
10	4,289,498,624	8,377,927	3	1	0				
11	3,176,242,688	6,203,599	3	2	0				
12	3,221,261,288	6,291,525	3	3	0				
13	3,221,249,536	6,291,503	3	4	0				
14	4,289,551,872	8,378,031	3	6	0				
15	32,256	63	3	7	0				
16	3,221,266,208	6,291,535	3	8	0				
17	8,481	16	3	8	0				
18			3	9	0				
19	426,466,816	832,943	3	9	0				
20	42,266,112	82,551	3	9	0				
21	40,448	79	3	9	0				
22	4,289,814,016	8,378,543	3	10	0				
23	624,365,056	1,219,463	3	3443	0	971757832f7dd9516977985999f527ca			
24	470,878,772	1,210,231	3	3447	0				


File Properties for ntldr (PS 1219463 LS 1219400 CL 152425 SO 000 FO 0 LE 1):

- Name: ntldr
- Description: File, Hidden, System, Read Only, Archive
- Last Accessed: 07/08/08 01:59:59PM
- File Created: 03/25/05 07:00:00AM
- Last Written: 07/08/08 01:59:59PM
- Entry Modified: 07/08/08 01:59:59PM
- File Acquired: 09/04/08 09:22:32AM
- Logical Size: 297,072
- Initialized Size: 297,072
- Physical Size: 299,008
- Starting Extent: 0C-C152425
- File Extents: 1
- Permissions: 0
- References: 0
- Physical Location: 624,365,056
- Physical Sector: 1,219,463
- Evidence File: 3
- File Identifier: 3443
- Code Page: 0
- Hash Value: 971757832f7dd9516977985999f527ca


Step 4, Review and record the resulting hash value.




Step 5, Open X-Ways Forensics




Step 2, Select Tools->Open Disk, Select the FRES disk, press OK



Step 3, Note total sector size.




Step 4, Select the sector of disk hashed previously during the baseline gathering phase. Press Ctrl-F2 to bring up the hashing dialog.




Step 5, Select MD5 as the hashing type and press Ok, record and compare resulting hash with hash obtained during baseline operation.


4.6 Write Prevention Testing – Windows




Step 1, Open newly mounted F-Response Disk, select the ntldr or bootmgr file.




Step 2, Right click and select delete. Press Yes to delete




Step 3, Confirm system response of File deleted successfully.



Step 4, Create new file, right click and create new Text Document.



Step 5, Open new text document, add arbitrary content, save and close.



Step 6, Confirm system response of File created successfully.

```

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
C:\fau\FAU.x86>dd if=\\.\Zero of=\\.\physicaldrive2 seek=220479488 bs=512 count=
1 --localwrt
Disk: F w <S/N >
Geometry:
    Cylinders:           1044
    Tracks per Cylinder: 255
    Sectors per Track:   63
    Bytes per Sector:    512

    Total Size:          8589934592
    Media Type:          Fixed hard disk media

Drive Information:
    Partition Count:      4
    Partition Style:      MBR
    Signature:            3050304F

    Partition:            1
    Starting Offset:      0x0000000000007e00
    Length:               0x000000001ff582800
    Type:                  IFS
    Bootable:              Yes

    Partition:            0
    Starting Offset:      0x0000000000000000
    Length:               0x0000000000000000
    Type:                  Unknown
    Bootable:              No


    Partition:            0
    Starting Offset:      0x0000000000000000
    Length:               0x0000000000000000
    Type:                  Unknown
    Bootable:              No

    Partition:            0
    Starting Offset:      0x0000000000000000
    Length:               0x0000000000000000
    Type:                  Unknown
    Bootable:              No


Output: \\.\physicaldrive2
1+0 records in
1+0 records out
512 bytes written

C:\fau\FAU.x86>
C:\fau\FAU.x86>_
  
```

Step 7, Open FAU DD, use DD command to write zeros to arbitrary sector on disk.



Step 7, Return to F-Response testing computer, confirm no data changes have occurred.



The screenshot shows the WinHex application window titled "WinHex - [Hard disk 0, Partition 1]". The interface includes a menu bar (File, Edit, Search, Position, View, Tools, Specialist, Options, Window, Help) and a toolbar. Below the menu bar, there's a status bar indicating "Hard disk 0" and "Hard disk 0, Partition 1".

The main window is divided into two panes. The left pane shows a file system view with a list of files and folders:


Name	Ext.	Size	Created	Modified	Accessed	Attr.	1st sector
clock.avi	avi	81.0 KB	03/25/2005 08:00:00	03/25/2005 08:00:00	11/20/2008 17:40:22 A		1197296
cmsetacl.log	log	373 B	11/20/2008 22:44:41	11/20/2008 23:20:04	11/20/2008 23:20:04 A		6300810
Coffee Bean.bmp	bmp	16.7 KB	11/20/2008 22:45:11	03/25/2005 08:00:00	11/20/2008 22:45:11 A		1524760

The right pane shows a hex view of a file. The top part of the hex view displays the file's metadata, including its name, size, and creation/modification dates. Below this, the hex data is shown in a grid format, with each row representing a byte offset and its corresponding hexadecimal value. The right side of the hex view shows the ASCII representation of the data, which appears to be a mix of random characters and some recognizable text fragments like "MZ", "PE", and "Rich".

At the bottom of the window, there's a status bar showing the current sector (430624 of 1675572) and the offset (220479488). A small "Data Interpreter" window is also visible in the bottom right corner, showing the current byte offset and its interpretation.

Step 8, Use Winhex to review selected sector and confirm zeroing operation was unsuccessful.

4.7 Write Prevention Testing – Linux, Apple OS X



Step 1, Open the attached disk using X-Ways, record the value of one arbitrary sector of information.

```

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe

C:\fau\FAU.x86>dd if=\\.\Zero of=\\.\physicaldrive2 seek=106929152 bs=512 count=
1 --localwrt
Disk: F F (S/N )
Geometry:
    Cylinders:           522
    Tracks per Cylinder: 255
    Sectors per Track:   63
    Bytes per Sector:    512

    Total Size:          4294967296
    Media Type:          Fixed hard disk media

Drive Information:
    Partition Count:     4
    Partition Style:     MBR
    Signature:           D6E7E

    Partition:           1
    Starting Offset:     0x0000000000007e00
    Length:              0x0000000000065f1c00
    Type:                Unknown
    Bootable:            Yes


    Partition:           2
    Starting Offset:     0x0000000000065f9a00
    Length:              0x00000000000f98b7a00
    Type:                Unknown
    Bootable:            No

    Partition:           0
    Starting Offset:     0x0000000000000000
    Length:              0x0000000000000000
    Type:                Unknown
    Bootable:            No

    Partition:           0
    Starting Offset:     0x0000000000000000
    Length:              0x0000000000000000
    Type:                Unknown
    Bootable:            No

Output: \\.\physicaldrive2
1+0 records in
1+0 records out
512 bytes written
  
```

Step 2, Use DD to output zeros to the selected arbitrary sector.



```
fedora-fc4-i386 on fresponse-esxi.home
File View VM
[red square] [yellow square] [green square] [red square] [blue square] Connect CD/DVD 1 [blue square] [blue square] [blue square]
[root@new-host-2 ~]# dd if=/dev/sda bs=512 count=1 skip=208846 | hexdump
1+0 records in
1+0 records out
00000000 414c 4542 4f4c 454e 0001 0000 0000 0000
00000010 c89d 9dc5 0020 0000 564c 324d 3020 3130
00000020 5432 4b56 5766 3277 7a63 486e 537a 6873
00000030 3764 4a32 7358 6b46 466e 6e56 4543 6f6c
00000040 7a00 f988 0000 0000 0000 0003 0000 0000
00000050 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
00000060 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
00000070 f800 0002 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
00000080 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
*
00002000
[root@new-host-2 ~]# _
```

Step 3, On the original disk, dump the sector in question using dd and hexdump, compare the resulting values to confirm no writes have taken place.

Appendix A. Contacts

A.1 Agile Risk Management LLC

2202 N West Shore Blvd, Suite 200
Tampa, FL 33607

Table 1: Agile Risk Management LLC Contacts

Contact	Title	Contact Information
Matthew Shannon	Principal	mshannon@f-response.com
Matthew Decker	Principal	mjdecker@f-response.com

Appendix B. Legal Notices

Copyright © 2009 Agile Risk Management, LLC. All rights reserved.
This document is protected by copyright with all rights reserved.

B.1 Trademarks

F-Response® is a registered trademark of Agile Risk Management, LLC. All other product names or logos mentioned herein are used for identification purposes only, and are the trademarks of their respective owners.

B.2 Statement of Rights

Agile Risk Management, LLC products incorporate technology that is protected by U.S. patent and other intellectual property (IP) rights owned by Agile Risk Management LLC, and other rights owners. Use of these products constitutes your legal agreement to honor Agile Risk Management, LLC's IP rights as protected by applicable laws. Reverse engineering, de-compiling, or disassembly of Agile Risk Management, LLC products is strictly prohibited.

B.3 Disclaimer

While Agile Risk Management LLC has committed its best efforts to providing accurate information in this document, we assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies that may be contained herein, and we reserve the right to make changes to this document without notice.